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For an N players coordination games, Tanaka (2000) proved that the
notion of N/2 stability deﬁned by Schaﬀer (1988) is a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for such a long run equilibrium in an evolutionary process with
mutations (in the sense of Kandori, et. al. (1993)). We argue that the
critical number in Schaﬀer’s stability is not unique in every application, but
can vary with variables determined before the coordination games. In our
speciﬁc model, these variables are the portfolio choices of the banks. We
derived a Z* stability condition for the long run equilibrium for the banking
system, in which there is no speculative bank run. This critical number
of players is a function of the size for risky investment, and varies with
total risky investments when there are more than two banks. We use this
framework to analyze the eﬀect of speculative behavior on banks’ risk taking
and the phenomenon of system risk, calculating the probability when more
than one banks fail together (system risk).
1JEL classiﬁcation:C 7 3 , G 2 1 .
Keywords: speculative run, evolution process, random mutations, portfolio
management, system risk, equilibrium selection, long run stability.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since Diamond and Dybvig1 (1983), the speculative behavior in the banking sys-
tem has received much attention in the literature. Speculative run refers to the
case where all depositors demand their money simultaneously, which then forces
the bank to liquidate its assets at short notice, which may provoke its failure. This
equilibrium, however, is just one of the two in the coordination games where all
depositors make their simultaneous decisions to withdraw or not. Like all coordina-
tion games, e.g., the stock or exchange markets, the multiplicity and indeterminacy
problem has impeded further analysis on the eﬀects of speculative behavior to the
banking system, let alone the contagious eﬀects of bank failures, noticed as system
risks.
There have been several approaches2 proposed to resolve this indeterminacy.
We focus our attention on the one driven by the evolutionary force with the random
mutations by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993, hence KMR). In the evolutionary
explanation, it is assumed that the time span for depositors’ decisions is stretched
into long enough periods, and an explicit dynamic process is speciﬁed describing
1Diamond and Dybvig (1983) studied a single bank screening model, with incomplete infor-
mation about inﬁnitely many depositors’ types for early and late consumption. They showed
that there are two types of Bayesian equilibria. One, a Pareto-dominant equilibrium, has only
depositors with genuine preference for early consumption withdrawing early. The second, a
Pareto-dominated speculative bank run equilibrium, has depositors who actually prefer late con-
sumption, fearing withdrawal by others of the same type, also withdrawing early.
2One approach is to introduce sunspots, which turns the coordination games into a game with
incomplete information (see Harsanyi (1973)). This approach does not select either equilibrium,
rather, it characterises the range of private information where each equilibrium happens. Recent
literature (Goldstein and Pauzner (2003) for example) has applied the approch of global game
by Classon and Van Damme (1993). The intution is to introduce private observation of each
agent about the incomplete information in the sunspots model. They show that, a risk dominant
equilibrium will be selected if agents adopt dominant strategies in the incomplete information
games (See also Morris and Shin (2002)).
1how depositors adjust their choices over time as they learn (from experience) about
the other depositors’ choices. ”This approach tries to explain how an equilibrium
emerges, based on trial-and-error leaning” (KMR, p30). Unfortunately,t h i sd o e s
not help on equilibrium selection, since both equilibria (due to their strictness)
survive the evolutionary force of this sort.
The contribution of KMR is to introduce a random switch3 (characterized by a
Markov chain) into the evolutionary process. This randomness allows transitions
(perpetually ﬂuctuates) from one equilibrium to the other in the course of evo-
lution, and an equilibrium is called long term equilibrium, if the system spends
most of the time on that equilibrium. Tanaka (2000) showed that the N/2 stability
deﬁned by Schaﬀer (1988) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for such a long
run equilibrium in the sense of KMR. Temzelides (1997) applied this N/2 stability
to the Diamond and Dyvig’s model, and showed that a suﬃciently high deposit
rate suﬃces to select the no run equilibrium as the long term equilibrium.
The purpose of this paper is to argue that the critical number in Schaﬀer’s
stability is not unique in every application, but can vary with variables determined
before the coordination games of depositors. In our speciﬁcm o d e l ,t h ev a r i a b l e s
are portfolio choices of the banks. We derived a Z* stability condition for the
long run equilibrium in the banking system. This critical number of players is a
function of the size for risky investment, and varies with total risky investments
when there are more than two banks. We use this framework to analyze the eﬀect
of speculative behavior on banks’ risk taking, and the phenomenon of system risk,
calculating the probability when more than one banks fail together.
In the present paper, banks act as portfolio managers4, essentially developed
3Kim (1996) compares the vaious evolutionary froces with randomness, including Matsui and
Matsuyama (1995), Young (1993), KMR (1993), and Foster and Young (1990). KMR assumes a
random (formulated by the Markov chain) mutation.
4It is well known that suﬃciently large exogenous shocks can cause a crisis. For example,
Allen and Gale (1998) describe a model in which ﬁnancial crises are caused by exogenous asset-
2by Pyle (1971), and Hart and Jaﬀee (1974). The idea is to assimilate all assets
and liabilities of the bank and consider the whole bank itself as an enormous
portfolio of these securities. Klein (1974) pointed a major weakness in traditional
portfolio theoretic model that ceteris paribus, if a bank wishes to increase its
loan/asset ratio it must accept a reduction in the marginal return on loans. That
is, the return is increasing, but the marginal rate of return is decreasing in the
size of investment. The most famous application of this approach is to provide a
framework to analyze the risk taking behavior with the rescue policy (e.g., bail out)
in case of failures (see Freixas and Rochet (1998)). Here, it serves a more important
role in that it provides a channel to explain the interconnection among banks:a s
quantity competition in an industry, the concavity of the marginal value function
induces a game among banks’ investments. Thus, via their mutual inﬂuence on
marginal value of the same risky assets, the extent that banks are connected will
be determined in the system. In other words, we can use this framework to discuss
the system risk problem.
Evidence of bank crises caused by bad portfolio management can be found in
Japan. Total commercial loans outstanding as a percentage of GDP was recorded
to increase from 73% in 1986 to 97% in 1992. Most of the loans were to the home
loan ﬁnance companies, to their keiretsu aﬃliates and to borrowers speculating
in real estate property. Foo (2003) observed that the banks are aﬀected by the
stock market downturn as the Nikkei’s drop shrinks the value of the banks’ stock
portfolio. The banks depend on a rising stock value to boost capital gains on proﬁts
or sell their stock portfolio assets to write oﬀ their NPLs. With a falling stock
market, the banks have trade oﬀ losses to both their NPLs and their stock portfolio.
Moreover, the declined stock portfolio erodes the paper gains use to meet the strict
Basle international capital adequacy standards of 8% of outstanding loans.
We consider the following two period game, after adding speculative with-
return shocks. Following a large (negative) shock to asset returns, banks are unable to meet
their commitments and are forced to default and liquidate assets.
3drawals among depositors in Klein’s portfolio choices. At the beginning of the
ﬁrst stage, banks, receiving5 a total one unit of fund, determine the proportion
to invest in safe asset (high liquidity) or risky asset (low liquidity). Safe asset
gives low but certain return, while the risky asset gives high but uncertain returns
containing two parts: deterministic par t(a sK l e i n)a n dar a n d o mt e r m .At r a d e
oﬀ will be: the beneﬁt for investing more risky asset is for high return; while the
cost will be the possible negative shock and the penalty for early liquidation. The
shock is realized and observed by each agents at the end of the ﬁrst stage. Observ-
ing this shock, agents make decisions whether to withdraw their deposits from the
bank, and the payment of the investments are received at the end of stage two, if
the banks did not fail. In such a way, the whole banking system are connected.6.
Our speciﬁc results include: ﬁrst, we propose a Z* stability condition, which is
proved to be a necessary and suﬃcient condition for such a long run equilibrium
in the sense of KMR. This critical number of Z* is a function of the total risky
investment in the banking system. In the case with two banks, this value could
vary across banks. Second, speculative behaviors do not frustrate single bank’s
risky taking, but rather, encourage the bank to maintain a high enough level of
risky investment, to keep the system stay in the equilibrium of no run. This
indicates that although the speculative run equilibrium will be eliminated in the
long run, the probability of fundamental run will increase with the mere possibility
of speculative behavior. Third, the singleb a n kc a s ed o e sn o tn e c e s s a r i l ya p p l yt o
t h ec a s ew i t hm u l t i p l eb a n k s . S y m m e t r i cb a n k sc a nt a k ed i ﬀerent level of risks,
which induces a diﬀerent in the probability of bank failures. The probability of
joint failures increases, compare to the case without speculation, but the individual
probability of bank failures do not necessarily increase.
5Here we do not consider predeposit decision, because consuemrs would not agree to deposit
if they knew that a run would take place (see Peck and Shell (2003)).
6The timing is similar to the timing in the sunspot literature (see Peck and Shell (2003) and
Ennis and Keister (2002).
4Temzelides (1997) also studied equilibrium selection by evolutionary process in
a banking system where depositors can strategically choose to withdraw prema-
turely or to stay within a bank. Temzelides showed that by setting a suﬃciently
high deposit rate, banks can avoid the speculative run result in the post deposit
stage by selecting no run equilibrium as the long term equilibrium. The intu-
ition is that evolutionary force will pick up the strategy with high relative payoﬀ.
By increasing deposit rate, staying within the bank will give relative high payoﬀ.
Moreover, the probability of bank run can be decrease to zero hence. This no-run
result is criticized to be unrealistic ( Peck and Shell), because we do encounter
bank failures from time to time. Bank failures do happen in our model, and the
diﬀerence comes from our setting of a random shock, denoting the sudden change
of the fundamentals in the system. Hence, like Temzelides (1997), banks can avoid
speculative run in the long run, the probability of fundamental run increases.
Compared to the literature using Carlsson and van Damme (1993)’s framework,
since agents are assumed to make noisy observations about fundamentals. These
observations serve as a coordination device for agent beliefs about the true state
of the economy. The construction allows for determining a unique equilibrium for
each realization of fundamentals in the Diamond and Dybvig model. An excellent
paper analyzing this approach is Goldstein and Pauzner (2000).
Owing to its single bank mechanism problem, the problem of system risks is not
m e n t i o n e di nt h eD i a m o n da n dD y b v i gm o del. Chen (1999), Dasgupta (2003) and
Rochet and Vives (2002) extends Diamond and Dybvig model to explain contagious
bank failures due to bank runs, by considering interbank deposits like those in
Rochet and Tirole (1996). There are other interbank linkages like the contractual
obligations between banks, OTC derivative and money market transactions (Staub
(1998)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the model
with a representative bank. We characterize the criteria of a Z* stability and
5prove that it will induce a long run equilibrium in the sense of KMR. Section 3
extends the model to two banks, and the Z* stability is revisited. We then discuss
the probability of systemic risk and speculative behaviors. Section 4 contains the
concluding remark.
2T h e M o d e l
In this section, I describe the environment in a banking system with one bank. I
will turn to the multiple bank case in the next section. Throughout the model,
all agents are assumed risk neutral7 and services provided by bank(s) are assumed
homogenous.
The model has two periods, t =1 ,2. Figure 1 helps illustrating the timing.
Firstly, in the beginning of t = 1, there N identical depositors who put8 their
money in bank 1. This total deposit of one unit is the only source of fund (see
also Acharya,2001, Matutes and Vives (2000) for similar assumptions). The bank
b e h a v e sa sap o r t f o l i om a n a g e r 9 of this fund, and invests the borrowed fund in safe
a n dr i s k y( w i t hl e s sl i q u i d i t y )a s s e t .L e ts be the proportion invested in the safe
asset and r be the proportion invested in the risky asset. With fund constraint,
s + r = N. The investment is divisible (like Matutes and Vives (2000)).
Safe asset produces certain but relatively low return per unit of investment,
and to simplify (but will not aﬀect our point), the marginal rate of return is
assumed to be 1. In other words, the investment on safe asset performs more
7H e n c ew ed on o tc o n s i d e rt h ew e a l t he ﬀect coming from the increasing degree assumption of
relative risk attitude.
8There is no predeposit decision, that is, whether to deposit in a bank like Beck and Shell
(2003).
9The theory of portfolion management has helped for banking behavior, essentially developed
by Pyle (1971), and Hart and Jaﬀee (1974). The idea is to assimilate all assets and liabilities of
the bank into securities of a particualr, and to consider the whole bank itself as asn enromour
portfolio of these securites.
6like the preparation for sudden liquidity need. Risky asset, on the other hand,
produces a relatively higher but uncertain return. The return consists of two part:
deterministic and shock. The deterministic part is a increasing concave function,
reﬂecting the monopoly inﬂuence of the bank on the project. Following Klein
(1974), we assume this marginal rate of return to be a concave function of level of
investment. That is, if all investment lasts until the end of t =2 ,d e n o t eR(r)+ε
a st h em a r g i n a lr e t u r nf o rp e ru n i to fi n v e s t m e n to nr i s k ya s s e t ,a n dR0(r) > 0a n d
R00(r) < 0. The shock reﬂects unexpected eﬀect, which is distributed according to
F(.)o v e r( −∞,∞), with density function of f(). In case of premature withdrawal
(which is divisible), there will be a ﬁne of λ>0, p e ru n i to fi n v e s t m e n tw i t h d r a w n ,
catching the suspending cost of withdrawal.
Having made its investment decision under uncertainty, we follow Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) in assuming that the bank is mutually owned and liquidated
in period 2. So, the chief managers of the bank and the depositors, who do not
withdraw in period 1, will get a pro rata share of the bank’s assets in period 2.
Since the determination of share of proﬁt is not our main point, we assume that
a proportion α, 0 <α<1, of the banks’ asset will pay the salaries to the chief
manager, and (1 − α) will be splitted to the remaining depositors.
In the end of t = 1, the shock on the risky asset is realized. Having observed
the bank’s portfolio decision10 and the value of realized shock, each depositor de-
termines whether to withdraw from the bank in the beginning of t = 2. Here,
we concentrate on the coordination eﬀect among depositors (see also Temzelides
(1997)), without discussing mimicking behavior induced by the assumption of pri-
vate information about the types of depositors (like the DD model). Each depositor
needs to compare the relative returns for early and late withdrawals, which de-
pend on the size of shock as well as the total number of withdrawers. Let z (to be
10That is, we consider full disclosure of the bank’s portfolio decision. Partially disclosure like
in Davies and McManus (1991), and Matutes and Vives (2000) will be mentioned in our further
research.
7endogenously determined) be the number of depositors who choose to stay until
the end of t =2 . T h ep e ru n i tr e t u r nf o rw i t h d r a w i n gn o wi sa s s u m e dt ob e1
if the bank is solvent; if the bank becomes insolvent, it is assumed that each de-
positor gets the payment from deposit insurance ω,w i t hω > 0. In Diamond and
Dybvig (1983, p408), ω is assumed to be zero. That is, let ε∗(r,z)b et h el e v e lo f
shock below which the bank will become insolvent. The per unit return for early
withdrawal is u1(r,z,ε).
u
1(r,z,ε)=1 if ε > ε
∗(r,z),
= ω11 if ε < ε
∗(r,z).
Here, insolvency denotes the case where a bank’s equity reaches a non-positve
value (Freixas and Rochet (1998, p 248)). Let π(r,z,ε) denote the bank’s equity
value given that the withdrawing number is z. There are two possible values for
π(r,z,ε): if z > r,t h eo v e r a l lw i t h d r a w a li sa ﬀordable by the liquidity preparation,
then π(r,z,ε)= (z − r)+ r[R(r)+ε]; if z<r , the bank needs to pay the per unit
ﬁnes π for convertibility if the investment, and hence π(r,z,ε)= (r−(1+λ)(r−z))
[R(r −(1+λ)(r −z))+ε]. In both cases, π(r,z,ε)i si n c r e a s i n gi nz and ε. Hence
the critical value ε∗(r,z) is the value such that for z > r, (z −r)+ r[R(r)+ε]=0
and for z<r ,(r−(1+λ)(r−z))[R(r−(1+λ)(r−z))+ε]. =0 .ε ∗(r,z) is smaller
when z > r. It is important to notice that insolvency involves with two kinds of
bank failures: fundamental run and speculative run. The former happens when
ε<ε ∗(r,N), and the latter happens when ε∗(r,N) <ε<ε ∗(r,1). assumption
(continuous, monotonically increasing) guarantees that ε∗(r,N)a n dε∗(r,1) exist.
If a depositor does not withdraw prematurely, then she will get a pro rata share





if ε > ε
∗(r,z),
= ωi f ε < ε
∗(r,z).
All returns are realized in the end of t =2 .
8This game is solved backward. It is a typical n player coordination game, so
the following result has been proved by various literature. (footnote here)
Lemma The states of z =0and z = N are the only two NE in pure strategy.
Proof: See the proof for Lemma one in Kim (1996). ¤




− 1 if ε > ε
∗(r,z),
=0 if ε < ε
∗(r,z).
KMR presented an analysis of long run equilibria of stochastic evolutionary dy-
namics for 2×2 games. Tanaka (2000) extends their model to an N players game.
To incorporate this approach, it is assumed that the depositors take turn (with
uncertain order) to make their withdrawing decisions, and if the interval between
turns is suﬃciently small, the time span for the second period can be stretched to
be suﬃciently (in KMR’s sense) very long. Let the subscript t denote the value
for a variable at run t. Then zt denote the number of agents choosing to stay in
run t. A Darwinian deterministic component is deﬁned as: zt+1 = b(zt) Hence
b(z) >zwhen ϕ(r,z,ε) > 0, and b(z) <zwhen ϕ(r,z,ε) < 0.
Two related notions on evolutionary stability are deﬁned as follows. Firstly, the
notion of ﬁnite population Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) by Schaﬀer (1988)
is deﬁned as the following: if ϕ(r,n −1,ε) > 0, staying is a ﬁnite population ESS;
if ϕ(r,1,ε) < 0, withdrawing is a ﬁnite population ESS.
Lemma Both the states of z =0and z = N are equilibrium in ESS.
Proof: Since both are strict equilibrium, the results are proved in, for example,
Weibull (1995). ¤
Second, Shaﬀer (1988) further deﬁnes M-stabilty of ﬁnite population ESSs.
Consider a state in which all players chooses not withdrawing. If there are M or
9fewer mutant players chooses to withdraw, the average payoﬀ of the players who
choose to stay is larger than the average payoﬀ of the mutant players, then staying
is called an M- stable (ﬁnite population ) ESS. Formally, staying is an M-stable
ESS if ϕ(r,z,ε) > 0f o rz>M ,a n dϕ(r,z,ε) < 0f o rz<M .W h e nM = N/2w e





N/2 stability of staying means that, when N/2 (a half of population) or fewer
mutant players choose to withdraw, the average payoﬀ of the players who choose
to stay is larger than the average payoﬀ the mutant players. Tanaka (2000) showed
that N/2 stability of a ﬁnite population evolutionarily stable strategy deﬁned by
Shaﬀer (1988) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a long run equilibrium
in the sense of KMR. In Temzelides (1997), there is no random shock ε,a n dt h e
risky investment is replaced with deposit rate. But most importantly, Temzelides
replaced z in ϕ(r,z,ε)w i t hN
2 to characterize the conditions of deposit rates for
” s t a y i n g ”t ob ea nN
2 stable ESS. We argue that the critical value is no longer
N
2 when r is determined before the beginning of the coordination games. The
intuition is easily seen from comparing u1(r,z,ε)a n du2(r,z,ε), where a higher
r will increase the advantage for staying, and hence will increase the number of
mutants to defect from the equilibrium. Hence, denote Z∗(r,ε)a st h en u m b e ro f
agents choosing to stay, given r and ε.
Proposition (1) If ϕ(r,Z∗(r,ε),ε) > 0, a long run equilibrium is the state z=N,
where all agents stay. (2) If ϕ(r,Z∗(r,ε),ε) < 0, a long run equilibrium is
the state z=0, where all agents withdraw. (3) Z∗(r,ε) decreases with r and
ε.
Proof: See KMR’s theorem 3 and the theorem in Phode and Stegeman (1996).
¤
12This condition is for staying to be an N/2 or higher stable ESS. If the following condition
holids in addition to this equation, then staying is exactly N/2 stable. ϕ(r, N
2 − 1,ε) < 0
10Let b ε(r) be the lowest level of shocks that ϕ(r,Z∗(r,ε),ε) > 0. We need to deter-
mine the location of b ε(r). Since by deﬁnition, ε∗(r,z) is the level of shocks such that
π(r,z,ε)=0 , and ε∗(r,N) <ε ∗(r,z) <ε ∗(r,1). Because when ϕ(r,Z∗(r,ε),ε)=0 ,
we have π(r,Z∗(r,ε),ε)=
Z∗(r,ε)
(1−α) > 0. It is true that ε∗(r,Z∗(r,ε)) < b ε(r). We still
need to determine whether b ε(r) T ε∗(r, 1). Since b ε(r)i st h el e v e lo fs h o c k st h a t
will support all depositors to stay in the long run, and ε∗(r,1) is the level of shocks
that will support all depositors to stay right away. It must be that b ε(r) <ε ∗(r,1).
Moreover, since π(r,z,ε) takes two values depending on the size of r.L e tb ε1(r)a n d
b ε2(r) be the respective critical value for r 6 Z∗(r,ε)a n dr>Z ∗(r,ε). Comparing





∂r ¡0.Insummary,whenε > b ε1(r)a n db ε2(r)f o rr 6 Z∗(r,ε)
and r>Z ∗(r,ε), respectively, the bank will not encounter bank failure in the long
run.
In the beginning of the t = 1, the bank determine its portfolio choices on safe




In the beginning of t = 1, the bank max{π1(r,N,ε),π 2(r,N,ε)}.
Proposition (1) The optimal level of risky assets is higher with speculation. (2)
The bank will invest less than a half of the deposit on the risky asset.
Proof: Rearrange πk(r,N,ε)=( N − r)+r[R(r)+( 1− F(b εk(r))]. Let r and
r denote the values that maximizes π1(r,N,ε)a n dπ2(r,N,ε). The ﬁrst order
condition of maximization is: 1 = [R(r)+(1−F(b εk(r))]+r[R0(r)−f(b εk(r))]
∂b εk(r)
∂r .
Denote the RHS of the above equation as Xk(r). The second order condition of
maximization is that ∂Xk(r)/∂r < 0. Since b ε1(r) < b ε2(r), it can be checked from
the ﬁrst order conditions that r1 <r 2.
Suppose π1(r,N,ε) <π 2(r,N,ε), that is, by the deﬁnition of maximization,
X2(r2)=1> X2(r1), which cannot be true because ∂Xk(r)/∂r < 0 by the second
order condition. Hence it must be that π1(r,N,ε) > π2(r,N,ε). ¤
113 Multiple Banks and System Risk
In this section, we describe the case with two banks, and calculate the probability
of joint failures.
The timing of the game is as the single bank case. There are N depositors for
each bank, which invests the deposit on the safe and risky assets. Let si and ri be
the portfolio choices for bank i,a n dsi + ri = N.
The marginal returns for safe assets are assumed to be one, and that of risky
assets are a function of two banks’ risky investment, plus a random term, repre-
senting the eﬀects from unexpected shocks. That is, denote R(r1 + r1)+ε as the
marginal return for per unit of investment on risky asset, and Ri(.)=
R()
∂ri>0a n d
Rij(.)<0f o ri,j =1 ,2. The distribution of ε is as the single bank case.
Given banks’ portfolio decisions, each depositor observes the realization of
the random term and make their decisions to withdraw or stay. The decisions
are similar to the single bank case. Denote zi as the number of depositors who
choose to stay until the end of t =2 ,a n dε∗
i(r1,r 2,z i) as the level of shock below




i(r1,r 2,z i,ε)=1 if ε > ε
∗
i(r1,r 2,z i),




i(r1,r 2,z i) is the level of shock that πi(r1,r 2,z i,ε)=0 . Depending on the relative
size of ri, there are two possible values: The ﬁrst is when zi > ri, πi(ri,b rj,z i,ε)=
(zi − ri)+ ri[R(ri,b rj)+ε], where for j 6= i, b rj = rj if zj > rj, and b rj = rj −
(1 + λ)(rj − zj)i fzj <r j. The second term is when zi <r i, πi(ri,b rj,z i,ε)=
(ri−(1+λ)(ri−zi))[R(ri−(1+λ)(ri−zi))+ε], where for j 6= i, b rj = rj if zj > rj,
and b rj = rj−(1+λ)(rj−zj)i fzj <r j. Similar to the single bank case, ε∗
i(r1,r 2,z i)
is smaller when zi > ri. The fundamental bank run happens when ε<ε ∗
i(r1,r 2,z i),
which includes fundamental run (i.e., ε<ε ∗
i(r1,r 2,N)) and possible speculative
12run (i.e., ε∗
i(r1,r 2,N) <ε<ε ∗
i(r1,r 2,1)).
If a depositor does not withdraw prematurely, then she will get a pro rata share
of the bank’s assets in period 2. Let u2




(1 − α)πi(ri,b rj,z i,ε)
z
,i f ε > ε
∗
i(r1,r 2,z i),
= ωi f ε < ε
∗
i(r1,r 2,z i).
All returns are realized in the end of t =2 .
It is easily checked that there will be two NE in each bank. Let ϕi(r1,r 2,z i,ε)=
u2
i(r1,r 2,z i,ε)- u1
i(r1,r 2,z i,ε). We next derive the property of Z*- stability condi-
tion for these two banks. Denote Z∗
i (r1,r 2,ε) as the number of agents choosing
to stay in bank i,g i v e nr1,r 2 and ε. Let b εi
1(r1,r 2)a n db ε2
i(r1,r 2,λ)d e n o t et h e
critical values of ε such that ϕi(r1,r 2,Z∗
i (r1,r 2,ε),ε)=0f o rri 6 Z∗
i (r1,r 2,ε)
and ri >Z ∗
i (r1,r 2,ε), respectively. Let πk
i (r1,r 2,N,ε) be the corresponding pay-
oﬀ maximums, where πk
i (r1,r 2,N,ε)=m a x
r,s
R ∞
b εk(r1,r2){s + r[R(r1,r 2)+ε]}dF(ε),
k =1 ,2.
Proposition (1) Z∗
i (r1,r 2,ε)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nr1,r 2 and ε. (2) max{π1
i(r1,r 2,N,ε),
π2
i(r1,r 2,N,ε)} is decreasing in rj. (3) ri and rj can be diﬀerent.
Proof: (1) See the proof in KMR’s theorem 3. (2) Since Z∗
i (r1,r 2,ε) is decreas-
ing in r1,r 2 and ε, b εi
1(r1,r 2) decreases with rj by applying the implicit function
theorem on the condition ϕi(r1,r 2,Z∗
i (r1,r 2,ε),ε)=0 , and this implies the result.
¤
Proposition The probability of system risk is higher with speculation, but the
individual probability of bank failure does not necessarily increase.
Proof: Simply calculate the cumulative values F(b ε1
i(r∗
1,r ∗








Summer (2003) provides an excellent summary of the existing literature on
system risk. The evidence for speculative runs abounds both in Taiwan and in
13other countries. In December, 2003, Kaohsiung Business Bank in Taiwan suﬀered
a sudden withdrawal of 3.6 billions in one month, simply because of a whisper
of a rumor for bank run. Ironically, that bank has been taken over by Central
Deposit Insurance Corporation in 2002, and hence all depositors are fully insured.
In Japan, a speculator example of a bank run occurred in October 1995 where the
Hyogo Bank experienced more than the equivalent of $1billion withdrawals in just
one day. In 1991, in Rhode Island in the USA, a perfectly solvent bank was forced
to close after the TV channel, CNN, used a picture of this bank to illustrate a
story on bank closures, which lead the bank’s customers to believe the bank was
insolvent, whereas it was not.
Acharya (2001) interpreted system risks in a portfolio framework, where two
banks simultaneously choose whether to invest in highly related assets and the
returns for each asset is exogenously given and randomly distributed. This, how-
ever, summarizes the assets portfolio problems into an odd 2 × 2g a m ew i t ht w o
symmetric equilibria (i.e., combination like (highly related, low related) does not
have any meaning.
4 Concluding Remarks
For an N players coordination games, Tanaka (2000) proved that the notion of
N/2 stability deﬁned by Schaﬀer (1988) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for such a long run equilibrium in an evolutionary process with mutations (in
the sense of Kandori, et. al. (1993)). We argue that the critical number in
Schaﬀer’s stability is not unique in every application, but can vary with variables
determined before the coordination games. In our speciﬁcm o d e l ,t h e s ev a r i a b l e s
are the portfolio choices of the banks. We derived a Z* stability condition for the
long run equilibrium for the banking system, in which there is no speculative bank
run. This critical number of players is a function of the size for risky investment,
and varies with total risky investments when there are more than two banks. We
14use this framework to analyze the eﬀect of speculative behavior on banks’ risk
taking and the phenomenon of system risk, calculating the probability when more
than one banks fail together (system risk).
We consider the following two period game, after adding speculative with-
drawals among depositors in Klein’s portfolio choices. At the beginning of the
ﬁrst stage, banks, receiving13 a total one unit of fund, determine the proportion
to invest in safe asset (high liquidity) or risky asset (low liquidity). Safe asset
gives low but certain return, while the risky asset gives high but uncertain returns
containing two parts: deterministic par t(a sK l e i n)a n dar a n d o mt e r m .At r a d e
oﬀ will be: the beneﬁt for investing more risky asset is for high return; while the
cost will be the possible negative shock and the penalty for early liquidation. The
shock is realized and observed by each agents at the end of the ﬁrst stage. Observ-
ing this shock, agents make decisions whether to withdraw their deposits from the
bank, and the payment of the investments are received at the end of stage two, if
the banks did not fail. In such a way, the whole banking system are connected..
Our speciﬁc results include: ﬁrst, we propose a Z* stability condition, which is
proved to be a necessary and suﬃcient condition for such a long run equilibrium
in the sense of KMR. This critical number of Z* is a function of the total risky
investment in the banking system. In the case with two banks, this value could
vary across banks. Second, speculative behaviors do not frustrate single bank’s
risky taking, but rather, encourage the bank to maintain a high enough level of
risky investment, to keep the system stay in the equilibrium of no run. This
indicates that although the speculative run equilibrium will be eliminated in the
long run, the probability of fundamental run will increase with the mere possibility
of speculative behavior. Third, the singleb a n kc a s ed o e sn o tn e c e s s a r i l ya p p l yt o
t h ec a s ew i t hm u l t i p l eb a n k s . S y m m e t r i cb a n k sc a nt a k ed i ﬀerent level of risks,
which induces a diﬀerent in the probability of bank failures. The probability of
13Here we do not consider predeposit decision, because consuemrs would not agree to deposit
if they knew that a run would take place (see Peck and Shell (2003)).
15joint failures increases, compare to the case without speculation, but the individual
probability of bank failures do not necessarily increase.
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